Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks by Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Singh, Rajesh
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) Economics
5-3-2007
Optimal choice of monetary instruments in an
economy with real and liquidity shocks
Joydeep Bhattacharya
Iowa State University, joydeep@iastate.edu
Rajesh Singh
Iowa State University, rsingh@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Working Papers (2002–2016) by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bhattacharya, Joydeep and Singh, Rajesh, "Optimal choice of monetary instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks"
(2007). Economics Working Papers (2002–2016). 161.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers/161
Optimal choice of monetary instruments in an economy with real and
liquidity shocks
Abstract
Faced with real and nominal shocks, what should a benevolent central bank do, fix the money growth rate or
target the inflation rate? In this paper, we make a first attempt at studying the optimal choice of monetary
policy instruments in a micro-founded model of money. Specifically, we produce an overlapping generations
economy in which limited communication and stochastic relocation creates an endogenous transactions role
for fiat money. We find that when the shocks are real, welfare is higher under money growth targeting; when
the shocks are nominal and not large, welfare is higher under inflation rate targeting. While under inflation
rate targeting, it is always optimal to pursue an expansionary policy, it is never optimal to do so under money
growth targeting.
Keywords
overlapping generations, random relocation model, monetary targeting, inflation targeting, interest rate
targeting
Disciplines
Economics
This working paper is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_workingpapers/161
Optimal Choice of Monetary Instruments in an
Economy with Real and Liquidity Shocks
Joydeep Bhattacharyay Rajesh Singh
Iowa State University
Abstract
Faced with real and nominal shocks, what should a benevolent central bank
do, x the money growth rate or target the ination rate? In this paper, we
make a rst attempt at studying the optimal choice of monetary policy in-
struments in a micro-founded model of money. Specically, we produce an
overlapping generations economy in which limited communication and stochas-
tic relocation creates an endogenous transactions role for at money. We nd
that when the shocks are real, welfare is higher under money growth targeting;
when the shocks are nominal and not large, welfare is higher under ination
rate targeting. While under ination rate targeting, it is always optimal to pur-
sue an expansionary policy, it is never optimal to do so under money growth
targeting.
JEL Classication: E31, E42, E63
Keywords: overlapping generations, random relocation model, monetary
targeting, interest rate targeting
This revised version: May 3, 2007. We thank the editor Peter Ireland and two anonymous
referees for their invaluable input, and David Mills and participants at the 2006 Winter Meetings of
the Econometric Society and the Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings in Iowa City for many helpful
comments.
yCorrespondence: Joydeep Bhattacharya, Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames
IA 50011, USA; e-mail: joydeep@iastate.edu
1
1 Introduction
How should a monetary authority decide whether to use the money stock or the
interest rate as its policy instrument of choice? Using a stochastic IS-LM model, with
reduction in variability of aggregate output as the yardstick, Poole (1970) was the
rst to pose this instrument problem. His advice was clear and precise: when the
shocks are real in nature, x the money supply; if the shocks are monetary, x the
interest rate. This prescription continues to guide monetary authorities around the
globe even today and remains to date among the most inuential policy counsels in
monetary economics.
Surprisingly, though, Pooles instrument problem has received almost no atten-
tion in formal micro-founded models of money, a lacuna we attempt to remedy in this
paper.1 To that end, we produce a two-period lived pure-exchange overlapping gener-
ations model in the tradition of Townsend (1987) and Champ, Smith, and Williamson
(1997) where limited communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous
transactions role for at money.2 At the end of each period a fraction (deterministic
or random) of agents is relocated (the movers) to a location di¤erent from the one
they were born in and the only asset they can use to communicatewith their past is
at money. This allows money to be held even when dominated in rate of return. The
other asset is a commonly available linear storage technology with a xed real return.
The stochastic relocationsact like shocks to agentsportfolio preferences and, in
particular, trigger liquidations of some assets at potential losses. They have the same
consequences as liquidity preference shocks in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and
motivate a role for banks that take deposits, hold cash reserves, and make other less
liquid investments. Depending on agentsrisk aversion, the bankscash reserves are
sensitive/insensitive to the real return on money.
We study two variants of this model, one in which there are real shocks (the
1Stern and Miller (2004) argue that questions regarding optimal monetary policy are best con-
ducted in dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models of money that incorporate a rationale for
why money is held even when dominated in return by assets of similar risk prole. Poole (1970)
satises all these desiderata except for the return dominance issue and the fact that his criterion for
optimality is not agentswelfare. It also deserves mention that our work is not directly comparable
to that of Pooles because monetary disturbances have no direct e¤ect on output variability in our
setup.
2The random relocation with limited communication model was popularized by Champ, Smith,
and Williamson (1997) and has been used to investigate monetary policy issues in Paal and Smith
(2000), Smith (2002), Antinol, Huybens, and Keister (2001), among others.
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young-age good endowment of the agents is stochastic), and one where the fraction
of agents relocating is itself random (liquidity preference or monetary shocks). In
either case, banks can promise a real return to only the non-movers. For the movers,
the banks can promise an amount of money (paid out of the banks reserve holdings)
but not the real return on it. To see this, consider the case of endowment shocks.
Here, the bank this period cares about next periods endowment because the latter
will potentially inuence that periods money demand and hence the price level and
therefore a¤ect the return on money between this period and the next. But next
periods money demand depends on the following periods endowment, and so on.
We assume that all agents know the distributions of the real or monetary shocks
and form expectations about the return on money conditional on these distributions.
We focus solely on long run stationary equilibria under which agents expectations
are coordinated across time, i.e., expectations of one generation are validated by the
behavior of the next and so on ad innitum.
Can the model tell us if ination targeting (or interest rate targeting) is superior
in an ex ante welfare sense to money growth targeting, and when? As a benchmark,
we start by studying the deterministic case. Here, as originally noted by Poole, it ob-
viously makes no di¤erence whatsoever whether the policy prescription is in terms of
setting the interest rate or in terms of setting the money stock.... The best policy, as
discussed in Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) is to hold the money stock xed
(zero ination). Here the social opportunity cost of using money is the lost return
from storage while the private opportunity cost of money is the nominal interest rate;
these are equalized when the net ination rate is zero. In the deterministic case, since
every period is exactly the same, the government faces a static problem and hence
cares only about this intratemporal margin. With shocks, however, the governments
problem is generically no longer static; an intertemporal (intergenerational) margin
appears. Since shocks hit di¤erent generations asymmetrically, the government has
to pay attention to providing some amount of intergenerational insurance. To achieve
this, the government may opt to trade o¤ intratemporal for intertemporal e¢ ciency
and this may cause optimal monetary policy to deviate from the zero ination policy.
When shocks are introduced, we are able to make a fair bit of analytical progress
under the assumption of logarithmic (henceforth log) utility. When the economy
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is hit with i.i.d. shocks to the endowment drawn from a general distribution, we can
show that the ex ante welfare maximizing (henceforth optimal) net money growth
rate is zero (xed money supply). The corresponding optimal ination targeting
policy calls for positive ination. We are also able to show that an optimally chosen
xed money growth rate is welfare superior to an optimally chosen xed ination
rate. For the class of CRRA utility functions with coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
, computations reveal that the optimal net money growth rate is negative for  < 1;
zero for  = 1; and negative again for  > 1: For the entire range of  studied,
the corresponding optimal ination targeting policy calls for positive ination and
optimal monetary targeting is welfare superior to optimal ination targeting.
For the most part, the situation is exactly reversed when the shocks are monetary
in nature, that is they a¤ect the fraction of agents relocating. For logarithmic utility,
we can prove that optimal monetary targeting involves a negative net money growth
rate while the corresponding optimal ination targeting policy calls for positive ina-
tion. For small enoughliquidity shocks, we can also prove that ination targeting
does a better job than monetary targeting; this result is however reversed for large
shocks. Numerical experiments conrm that the avor of these results carries over to
the CRRA case for a wide range of :
Overall, two strong themes emerge. First, our results indicate that when the
shocks are real, welfare is higher under money growth targeting; when the shocks are
nominal and not large, welfare is higher under ination targeting. Secondly, while
under ination targeting it is always optimal to pursue an expansionary policy, it is
never optimal to do so under money growth targeting.
Almost all the work done in this area employs models with sticky or staggered
prices, and very few, use welfare criteria to answer Pooles original question. Promi-
nent examples of work in the rigid prices tradition are surveyed in Woodford (2003).
Using a deterministic overlapping generations model, Smith (1994) compares the two
targeting procedures in terms of their e¢ ciency properties and goes on to isolate a
tension between e¢ ciency and determinacyof monetary equilibria reminiscent of
the nineteenth century quantity theory versus real bills doctrine controversy. This
tension is not a focus of our analysis. Liquidity shocks in the random relocation
environment (and their relation to banking crises) have also been studied in Champ,
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Smith, and Williamson (1997), Paal and Smith (2000), Smith (2002) and Antinol,
Huybens, and Keister (2001), and Antinol and Keister (2006). Our treatment of
liquidity shocks is di¤erent from that in these papers (see footnote 9 on this).
In a closely related paper, Porqueras and Smith (2003) study the optimal level
of interest rate smoothing under seasonal uctuations. They consider deterministic
two-period cycles of endowments, relocation, and storage returns and characterize the
properties of periodic equilibria under monetary and interest rate targeting. By com-
puting periodic interest rate policies that maximize welfare, they show that liquidity
shocks require relatively higher interest rate smoothing than endowment shocks. Our
paper substantially enlarges the scope of the analysis undertaken by Gomis-Porqueras
and Smith (2003). Not only do we evaluate the best rule for each monetary policy
instrument, we also rank monetary targeting against interest rate targeting for each
type of shock, an exercise closer in spirit to Poole (1970). It is also worth reiterating
that, while our results hold for the whole class of CRRA preferences, all of our results
for logarithmic preferences are derived analytically, allowing us to clearly lay out the
economic intuition that underlie these results. More importantly, by undertaking a
dynamic rational expectations equilibrium approach, our paper makes a theoretical
advance; it enables a tractable analysis of price-level uncertainty within a stationary
setting and within the context of the aforementioned literature on stochastic reloca-
tion models, a feature not present in the earlier papers.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we outline
the baseline model without uncertainty and compute optimal monetary policies. In
Section 3, we study the role of endowment uncertainty in shaping the optimal choice
of monetary instruments. In Section 4, we do the same with money demand shocks.
Section 5 presents the results from the computational experiments under CRRA util-
ity. In Section 6.1 we revert to logarithmic preferences for studying state-contingent
rules and then contrast them with the optimal money growth and ination rules. In
that section, we also discuss the welfare implications of monetary injections that are
implemented through proportional transfers. Section 7 concludes. Proofs of all major
results are in the appendices.
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2 The Environment
2.1 Primitives
We consider an economy consisting of an innite sequence of two period lived overlap-
ping generations. Time t is discrete and runs from ftg10 . At each date t, a unit mass
of identical young agents is symmetrically assigned to one of two locations. There is a
single good that may be consumed or stored. Each two-period-lived agent is endowed
with wt > 0 units of this good at date t when young and nothing when old; in Section
3 below we study a setting in which w is stochastic where we assume w is revealed
at the start of any date.
Let c2;t+1 denote the consumption of the nal good by a representative old agent
born at t: All such agents have preferences representable byEt u(c2;t+1) where u is
twice-continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in its argu-
ments. At points below, we will specialize to u(c) =

c1    1 =(1  ), with  > 0,
and u(c) = ln c when  = 1:
The assets available to the agents are goods, which they may store, and at
currency (money). If  > 0 units of the good are placed in storage at any date t  1,
then x  units are recovered from storage at date t+1, where x > 1. The quantity of
money in circulation at the end of period t  1, per young agent, is denoted Mt. Let
0 < pt < 1 denote the price level at date t. Let pt+1pt  t denote the ination rate
between period t and t+1. Then the gross real rate of return on money (Rm;t) between
period t and t+ 1 is given by Rm;t  pt=pt+1 = 1t : Also, let mt  Mt=pt denote real
money balances at date t; and It  xRm;t = xt denote the gross nominal interest rate
between t and t+ 1. Note that It represents the opportunity cost of cash relative to
storage. We assume that money is a badasset; when Rm;t is non-stochastic, this
translates into the assumption that
x > Rm;t for all t (1)
holds; eq. (1) will later be mapped into a restriction on the set of constant money
growth policies.
In addition to the store-of-value function of money, spatial separation and limited
communication generate a transactions role of money as in Townsend (1987). As
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such, money can be valued even if it is dominated in return by storage. The details
are outlined below and follow standard conventions setup in Schreft and Smith (1997)
or more recently in Haslag and Martin (forthcoming).
2.2 Random relocation
Each period, a (potentially stochastic) fraction  of the young agents is relocated to
the other location. We assume that the value of  is publicly known at the beginning
of each period. However, an individuals relocation status is not known until the end
of the period. In other words, at the start of each date, everyone knows how many
will move, but no one knows who will move until the end of the period. An agent that
is relocated cannot collect the return on any goods she has stored, or that have been
stored on her behalf, since goods cannot be transported across locations. However, if
an agent is carrying at currency when she is relocated, then the currency is relocated
with it.
Under the circumstances, there are two strategies an agent can use to transfer
income over time. First, she can save on her own, storing some quantity of goods
and acquiring some quantity of at currency. The problem is that if she is relocated
then she must abandon her stored goods, and if not, then she is stuck holding at
currency, a badasset (more below on this). Alternatively, she can deposit her entire
endowment in a perfectly competitive bank. The bank pools the goods deposited by
all the young agents and uses them to acquire a portfolio of stored goods and at
currency. It issues claims to the agents whose nature, timing and size are contingent
on their relocation status. If an agent does not get relocated, then she gets a return
on her deposit next period that is funded by the goods the bank has stored. If she
gets relocated, then she gets a return on her deposit in the same period that takes
the form of a at currency payment (whose real value will depend on the following
periods price level) funded by the banks holdings of at currency.3 Since banks can
pool individual risks, it can be checked that the latter strategy always dominates the
former and we will analyze the economy on this basis.4 Monetary policy inuences
the banks ability to provide risk sharing, an issue which lies at the heart of our
3Limited communication disallows banks from communicating in any way with banks on the
other island; in particular, the bank may not wire moneyor issues checks etc.
4Relocation status is public information; concerns regarding bank runs do not appear here.
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analysis.
2.3 Conduct of monetary policy
Here, we allow the government to conduct monetary policy in one of two possible
ways. The rst, called monetary targeting, is one where the government changes
the nominal stock of at currency at a xed non-stochastic gross rate  > 0 per
period, so that Mt = Mt 1 for all t. The second, called ination targeting, is
one where the government changes the nominal stock of at currency in such a way
as to keep the long-run gross ination rate xed at :
As an aside, also note that in this setting, since It  xRm;t = xt holds, nominal
interest rate targeting and ination targeting are identical instruments. Moreover, in
steady states, money growth targeting and ination targeting are equivalent. Below
we will show that in the presence of shocks, money growth targeting and ination
targeting are very dissimilar.
All money injections are implemented through lump sum transfers () to the
young agents. The period t budget constraint of the government is
 t =
Mt  Mt 1
pt
= mt  mt 1Rm;t 1 (2)
for all t  1. Taxes and transfers to old agents are discussed later in Section 6.1.
2.4 The banks problem
As a benchmark, it is useful to start by studying the banks problem for the purely
deterministic environment. As discussed earlier, the asset holdings of young agents
are assumed to be costlessly intermediated by perfectly competitive banks. These
banks hold portfolios of at currency and physical assets, which consist of stored
goods. Every young agent deposits her after-tax/transfer income in the bank. The
banks divide their deposits between stored goods st and real balances of at currency
mt, so that
wt +  t = mt + st . (3)
Dene t  mtwt+ t as the ratio of cash reserves to deposits. Banks announce a return
of dm;t to each mover (one who gets relocated) and dn;t to each non-mover (one who
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stays on in the location she was born). These returns satisfy some constraints. First,
relocated agents, of whom there are t; have to be given money and so the bank has
to use its holdings of cash reserves to pay them. Under assumption (1), it can be
checked that banks will not hold cash reserves to pay non-movers. Consequently,
tdm;t  tRm;t (4)
must hold, since money earns a return of Rm;t =
pt
pt+1
between t and t+ 1 (which the
bank takes as given). Similarly, the promised return to the non-movers must satisfy
(1  t) dn;t  (1  t)x: (5)
Additionally, t 2 [0; 1] must hold. Competition among banks for depositors will,
in equilibrium, force banks to choose return schedules and portfolio allocations so
as to maximize the expected utility of a representative depositor, subject to the
equality versions of the constraints we have described. For future reference, dene
cm;t  dm;t (wt +  t) as the old-age consumption of each mover and cn;t  dn;t (wt +  t)
as the old-age consumption of each non-mover.
If wt = w and t =  8t, i.e., the endowment and relocation probability are
known and xed (as in the standard deterministic random relocation model analyzed
by Schreft and Smith (1997)), the banks problem can be rewritten as
max
t2[0;1]

u
t

Rm;t (w +  t)

+ (1  )u

1  t
1   x (w +  t)

: (6)
The rst order conditions for this problem are given by
Rm;t  u0 (cm;t) = x  u0 (cn;t) for  > 0: (7)
The bank equates the marginal rate of substitution between the two types to the
marginal ratios of opportunity costs for their respective assets. Since x > Rm;t;
it follows that u0 (cm;t) > u0 (cn;t) ; it follows from the assumed concavity of u that
the banks promised per unit return to each mover will be less than that of a non-
mover. Since money is a poor asset and movers can use only money, their marginal
utility of consumption is higher than that of the non-movers; indeed it is higher by
a margin x=Rm;t: As we show below, a planner (appropriately constrained by limited
communication) would set this margin to x:
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It is easily checked that the rst order conditions to the problem in (6) for u(c) =
c1    1 =(1  ) is given by
Rm;t
t

Rm;t
 
= x

1  t
1   x
 
; (8)
the solution to which is given by
t (It) =

+ (1  ) (It)
1 

: (9)
Notice that when  = 1; the case of logarithmic utility studied extensively below, (9)
reduces to
t = ; (10)
in this case, the banks choice of the reserve-deposit ratio is independent of the nom-
inal interest rate. Then dm;t = Rm;t and dn;t = x and the consumption of each mover
is given by Rm;t (wt +  t) while that of a non-mover is x (wt +  t) :
Several points deserve mention here. First, monetary policy inuences the optimal
 in the case of CRRA utility only insofar as it determines the relative return on
money, It. Second, as is clear from (9), for all I > 1,  R  i¤  R 1. Intuitively,
think of the bank allocating its deposit base among two goods, the consumption
of movers and the consumption of non-movers. When the two are complements
(substitutes) a low return on money relative to storage (i.e., I > 1) requires that
the share of current incomeallocated to consumption of movers be relatively high
(low).
Finally, 0 (I) R 0;8I i¤  R 1. An increase in I has both income and substitution
e¤ects. First, it decreases the combined income available for consumption next period.
However, for any xed share , it a¤ects movers relatively more. Thus, when the
consumptions of movers and non-movers are complements, moversshare  must be
increased. On the other hand, when the two consumptions are substitutes, it is better
to shift consumption from movers to non-movers; hence,  should be lowered.
2.5 Welfare and optimal monetary policy
Below we rst consider a steady state under monetary targeting, obtained by xing a
constant money growth rate, . In the steady state ination equals the money growth
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rate as real balance mt is constant for all t, i.e., Rm = 1= = 1=. Then, steady state
welfare (indirect utility as a function of Rm =  1) for CRRA utility can be dened
as
W () =
fw +  ()g1 
1  
(


 ()

1

1 
+ (1  )

(1   ())
1   x
1 )
  1
1  ;
which, using (8), can be rewritten as
W () = max

fw +  ()g1 
1  

1

1 
 ()

 
  1
1   (11)
where  () and  () are obtained from (2) and (9), respectively, as derived below.
Optimal monetary policy In steady state (2) yields  =

1  1


m. Since
 (w + ) = m; we have m =  w =

1 

1  1




and
 =

1  1

24 w
1 

1  1



35 : (12)
Since I = x, we can rewrite (9) in steady states as
 =

+ (1  ) (x) 1 
: (13)
Then the problem of choosing the optimal (steady state welfare maximizing) max-
imizing welfare given by (11) subject to (12) and (13). Observe that monetary tar-
geting and ination targeting are equivalent in steady state; this is seen by replacing
 with  in (11), (12), and (13). We close this section with a fairly well-known result
about optimal monetary policy in this environment, the proof of which may be found
in Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005).
Proposition 1 Under ination targeting or equivalently under monetary targeting,
irrespective of the degree of risk-aversion, the welfare maximizing policy is to hold the
money stock xed (zero ination) if there are no shocks to endowments or liquidity
preference.
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To understand the intuition behind this result, we construct a psuedo-planning
problem (see Bhattacharya and Singh (2006) for details) in which the planner is
restricted to choose among allocations that are feasible in the decentralized economy.
If there is a monetary policy that allows the government in the decentralized economy
to achieve this planning allocation, then clearly it is the optimal policy choice.
To that end, focus attention solely on steady states. In the decentralized economy,
the assumption of limited communication prevents banks from using stored goods to
pay movers, i.e., they have to keep aside some goods to buythe money to give to
their moving clientele. In sum, the movers consume a portion of the current deposits
and therefore such portion can not be stored. In the psuedo-planning problem, we
constrain the planner similarly.5 In each period, the planner receives an endowment
of y goods in each island. At each island, he is constrained to use a portion of the
current endowment to pay the newly arrived people from the other island (those who
were born in the previous period and got relocated; there are  of them at each
island). The rest he can store for distributing next period among non-movers born
in the current period. The same sequence repeats the next period.6
Formally, at any date, such a planner who allocates w between the movers and
the non-movers would choose an allocation (cm; cn) so as to maximize u(cm) +
(1  )u(cn) subject to cm + (1  ) cn=x = w; the rst order condition would
reduce to the following constrained e¢ ciency condition:
u0 (cm)
u0 (cn)
= x: (14)
This is the usual within-period MRS = MRT condition which, at points below, will
be referred to as the intratemporal e¢ ciencyor intragenerational e¢ ciencycon-
dition.
The governments objective, of course, is to choose a  that maximizes stationary
welfare in a decentralized equilibrium. In such an equilibrium involving money, using
5The unconstrained planner, of course, would store the entire endowment (something the banks
under the limited communication assumption cannot) and equalize consumption across movers and
non-movers by giving them xw next period.
6It is important to note here that even though the planner in any period is trading o¤consumption
of the old movers of the previous generation against the consumption of future non-movers of the
current generation (who will consume only in the following period), assuming that the planner cares
equally for each generation, this is equivalent to a consumption allocation problem for any single
generation.
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Rm =
1

, (7) reduces to
u0 (cm)
u0 (cn)
= x: (15)
Comparing (14) with (15) reveals the optimal monetary policy choice to be  = 1:
As Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) argue, in an OG model, in steady
states, every unit of goods devoted to holding money is a unit that is not devoted
to acquiring storage; as such, the social opportunity cost of money is the return on
storage. Optimality requires that the private opportunity cost of holding money be
the same as the social opportunity cost of money. Of course, the private opportunity
cost of money is the nominal interest rate, I = x: Hence,  = 1 is the best choice.7
Indeed, as Wallace (1980) and Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) point out,
zero ination often has the presumption of being the optimal monetary policy in
monetary overlapping generation models.
In steady states, intratemporal e¢ ciency is achieved with a xed money stock
(zero ination). Since every period is exactly the same, the government faces a sta-
tic problem and hence cares only about this intratemporal margin. With shocks,
however, the governments problem is generically no longer static; an intertemporal
(intergenerational) margin appears. Since shocks hit di¤erent generations asymmet-
rically, the government pays attention to providing some amount of intergenerational
insurance. To achieve this, the government may opt to trade o¤ intratemporal for
intertemporal e¢ ciency and this causes optimal monetary policy to deviate from the
zero ination policy. This is the subject matter of the next two sections.
3 Endowment uncertainty
We now analyze an economy that is identical to the one studied above, except that
the endowment w is assumed to be stochastic. For analytical convenience, we assume
that w is drawn each period from an i.i.d. distribution with a pdf f(w) over support
[w; w] ; w > 0; w < 1: We denote by we the expected value of w; and by 2w; its
7As Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell (2005) argue, in standard innitely-lived agent models,
the gross social opportunity cost of providing money is one so it is optimal for the gross private
opportunity cost of holding money to be one the Friedman rule. In contrast, the social oppor-
tunity cost of providing money in OG models is x. This explains why the Friedman rule, I = 1 or
 = 1=x; is not the best monetary policy choice for the government in the model we study.
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variance. Shocks to the endowment represent real shocks. Our goal is to investigate
how monetary policy should respond to real uncertainty.
Allocations under stationary rational expectations equilibrium Recall that
at the point at which the bank solves its problem, the current endowment is known.
But the realization of next periods endowment has not occurred yet. The bank
indirectly cares about next periods endowment because the latter will potentially
inuence next periods money demand, hence the next periods price level and thus
the return on money between this period and the next. In this sense, the bank cannot
promise a xed real return to the movers anymore. All it can do is to let movers
know how much nominal balances are being kept aside for them. The bank knows
the distribution for w and forms expectations on the return on money conditional on
f(w); in a rational expectations equilibrium, these expectations are correct. We focus
solely on long run stationary equilibria under which expectations are coordinated
across time, i.e., expectations of one generation are validated by the behavior of the
next and so on ad innitum.
The banks problem (assuming it never nds it optimal to carry cash across peri-
ods; see below) in general is described by
max
t2[0;1]

Et

u
t

Rm;t (wt +  t)

+ (1  )Et

u

(1  t)x
(1  ) (wt +  t)

; (16)
where Et is an expectations operator conditional on date t information; in future E
will denote its unconditional (ex-ante) counterpart. Analogous to (7), the rst order
conditions for this problem are now given by
Et (u
0 (cm;t) Rm;t) = Et (x  u0 (cn;t))) Et (u0 (cm;t) Rm;t) = xEt (u0 (cn;t)) (17)
As in Smith (2002), we start by exploring in detail the analytically manageable
case of logarithmic utility. We assume that the bank never nds it optimal to use a
part of its cash reserves to pay non-movers. Below we will write down a su¢ cient
condition, a stochastic analog to (1), under which this assumption will be validated.
The banks problem is now described by (since only Rm;t depends on the realization
of wt+1)
max
t2[0;1]
Z w
w
 ln(Rm;t)f (wt+1) dwt+1 +  ln
ht

i
+ (1  ) ln

(1  t)x
1  

+ ln (wt +  t)

:
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(18)
Observe that since it knows the current period endowment and takes the return on
money and the size of the transfer as given, the banks choice of  will respond only
to the second and the third terms of the previous expression. Then, the choice of t
is given by
t =  for all t;
making the decision rule of the bank identical to that in the non-stochastic endowment
case [see (10)].
Even though endowment uncertainty has the potential to a¤ect the real return on
money, under log utility, the choice of  is not inuenced by this return. Indeed, the
choice of  is not state-contingent. Intuitively, an increase in the uncertainty about
the rate of return on money e¤ectively increases its opportunity cost. But the income
and substitution e¤ects cancel each other out for logarithmic utility. This will not be
the case in the more general CRRA formulation discussed below.
3.1 Monetary targeting
Under monetary targeting, the government xes the money growth rate at : Since
 t =
Mt Mt 1
pt
= mt

1  1


andmt = t (wt +  t) ; we havemt = t wt=

1  t

1  1


.
Hence, the equilibrium return on money is given by
Rm;t =
mt+1
mt
=
1

t+1wt+1
twt
1  t

1  1


1  t+1

1  1

 (19)
which reduces to Rm;t = 1
wt+1
wt
since t =  for all t. Notice since wt+1 is not known
at t; the bank cannot promise a xed real return to the movers anymore. Eq. (19)
captures the notion of price-level uncertainty, a feature that is absent in the literature
on random relocation models.
Notice further that with t =  for all t, mt =  wt=

1  

1  1


. Hence, the
equilibrium money demand is a xed non-stochastic fraction of the stochastic endow-
ment; as such, the volatility of money demand is induced entirely by the volatility in
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the endowment. Finally, as  t = mt

1  1


, we have
 t =

1  1

24 wt
1  

1  1


35 : (20)
When  = 1;  t = 0; in this case, from the ex-ante standpoint of the government,
monetary policy does not contribute to the volatility of post-tax/transfer income,
(wt +  t). In that case, the only uncertainty that the bank faces would come from the
return on money given by Rm;t = 1
wt+1
wt
. When  < 1 (a contractionary monetary
policy is implemented),  t < 0 obtains, and so wt +  t falls; i.e., the government
imposes a lump-sum tax on all agents and uses the proceeds to retire some of the
currency. Since less money chasesthe same amount of goods, the price level falls
raising the return on money making storage less attractive. The fall in wt +  t also
contributes to less investment in storage.
Monetary policy has di¤erent e¤ects on the two groups, movers and non-movers.
The latters consumption is given by x(wt +  t) while the formersby Rm;t(wt +  t):
For future reference, note that since wt +  t = wt=[1  

1  1


]; the consumption
of non-movers is given by cn;t = xwt1 +

and that of the movers by cm;t = 1
wt+1
1 +

.
We are now in a position to write down a su¢ cient condition on parameters under
which the bank would not carry cash balances across periods (to pay non-movers).
Condition 1 If agents have logarithmic utility, then in the economy with i.i.d. en-
dowment shocks, the bank will use currency only to pay the movers if and only if
x >
we
w
holds.
Now we are ready to evaluate welfare. Welfare at t is obtained by evaluating (18)
at t =  and using the equilibrium return given by (19):
Wt () = 
Z w
w
flnwt+1g f (wt+1) dwt+1+(1  ) ln (xwt) ln

1  

1  1


  ln:
(21)
Notice from (21) that monetary policy () has no e¤ect on the intertemporal margin
(the rst two terms on the r.h.s. of (21)). As such, as argued before, the presumption
is still in favor of zero ination being optimal since that would be intra and inter 
temporally e¢ cient.
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Welfare under uncertainty We adopt an ex-ante measure of welfare, which in
a stochastic overlapping generations economy with nitely lived agents, allows us
to obtain the stochastic analog of the golden rule. Here, a generations welfare is
dened as its lifetime expected utility where an unconditional expectation is taken
with respect to stationary distributions of exogenous as well as endogenous variables.
This measure, by construction, treats all generations symmetrically and makes each
of them representative. The unconditional expectation ensures that the derived
policy rules will be state-uncontingent or timeless.
Formally, since w is assumed to be drawn from a time-invariant i.i.d. distribution,
ex-ante stationary welfare is dened as W   E fW ()g = R W f (w) dw. Thus
using (21) we have
W  = (1  ) ln x+
Z w
w
flnwg f (w) dw   ln

1  

1  1


   ln (22)
What  is the best from the standpoint of stationary welfare? We dene ~ 
argmax fW g. Since W  is assumed to be concave in , ~ solves d
d
W  = 0; [notice
~ maximizes the last two terms in (22)]. For future reference, we dene ~W  
max

W .
Proposition 2 Under logarithmic utility, the optimal monetary policy is to keep the
money supply xed, i.e., ~ = 1:
It is interesting to note that the optimal prescription for the money growth rate
coincides with that in the economy with no real shocks studied in Section 2.5.
To see the intuition behind this result, it is useful to revisit the planners problem
in this environment. Analogous to the deterministic case discussed earlier, a planner
who allocates w between the movers and the non-movers would choose an allocation
that leads to the ex-ante marginal condition
E [u0 (cm)]
E [u0 (cn)]
= x; (23)
which is the intratemporal e¢ ciency or the intragenerational e¢ ciency condi-
tion.8 In the decentralized problem, recall the consumption of movers is given by
8Assume that the planner cares equally about each generation. In period t, after wt is realized,
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cm =
1

w
1 +

; and that of the non-movers by cn = xw1 +

: Then, for log utility, it is
easy to check that E[u
0(cm)]
E[u0(cn)] = x holds only when  = 1. In other words, intratemporal
e¢ ciency is ensured at  = 1: The question then arises: does cutting or raising 
from unity have any intertemporal benets that may overwhelm the loss of deviating
from intratemporal e¢ ciency? As discussed earlier and clear from (21), monetary
policy () has no e¤ect on the intertemporal margin and hence such an action has no
benets at all.
For future reference, note that when  = 1 obtains, cm = w and cn = xw
holds. Thus, in an ex-ante sense, both movers and non-movers face identical con-
sumption/income uncertainty arising entirely out of the endowment uncertainty.
As we demonstrate below, unlike in the deterministic case, the prescription for
optimal monetary policy will be di¤erent from zero ination under ination targeting.
3.2 Ination targeting
Under ination targeting, the government xes the ination rate at : It follows that
the real return to money is given by
Rm;t =
1

: (24)
Clearly in this case, any uncertainty about the rate of return on money is removed.
The government conducts monetary policy via time-varying taxes and transfers to
ensure money is an asset with a xed real return.
Since  t =
Mt Mt 1
pt
= mt   mt 1 ; we get mt = t (wt +  t) = t
 
wt +mt   mt 1

implying
mt =   t
(1  t)
mt 1 +
t
1  t
wt (25)
planner will allocate cm;t 1 to movers from period t   1; and cn;t to current non-movers so as to
maximize u(cm;t 1) + (1  )u(cn;t) subject to cm;t 1 + (1  ) cn;t=x = wt; then the rst order
condition to the planners problem reduces to
u0 (cm;t 1) = xu0 (cn;t) :
Ex-ante this is equivalent to (23):
E fu0 (cm)g = xE fu0 (cn)g :
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Notice that (25) represents an AR(1) process for real balances. With t = , the
autocorrelation parameter equals  = (1  ) whereas wt= (1  ) is a stochastic
forcing function. The invariant (long run) distribution for money balances will
depend on f (w) and . Denote the stationary distribution by 
 (m; f (w) ; ). A
necessary condition for its existence is 
(1 ) < 1:
Denote the mean and variance of the stochastic process for m dened in (25) with
t =  by m
e and 2m respectively. Then it is easily checked that
E (m)  me = w
e
1  + 

; 2m  E

(m me)2	 =   1 2 2w
1 
h

(1 )
i2 : (26)
Notice that me rises with  but 2m falls with .
Evaluating (18) at t =  and using (24) obtains
Wt () =   ln +(1  ) ln x+ln (wt +  t) =   ln +(1  ) ln x+ln
mt


(27)
From (27), it is apparent that  has two e¤ects on welfare, one through its e¤ect on
the return on money (captured by the   ln  term above) and the other via its e¤ect
on post-tax/transfer income (captured by the ln (wt +  t) or ln
 
mt


terms above).
As such, the government will have to pay attention not just to intratemporal but also
to intertemporal e¢ ciency when choosing . Using (27), ex ante welfare is dened as
W   E (W ()) =   ln  ln+(1  ) ln x+
Z
m
flnmg
 (m; f (w) ; ) dm (28)
Notice that the last term on the r.h.s of (28) corresponds to E(ln (wt +  t)) or the
mean value of log post tax income. We dene the optimal ination rate as ~ 
argmax fW g and its corresponding welfare as ~W   max

fW g. Henceforth, we
assume that W  is strictly concave in ; then ~ solves d
d
W  = 0.
Proposition 3 Under logarithmic utility, optimal ination targeting involves setting
a positive ination rate, or ~ > 1 obtains.
The proof of Proposition 3 relies on a second-order Taylor approximation of the
last term on the r.h.s of (28) around me. An intuition for this result is as follows.
The rst thing to note is that ination targeting completely eliminates uncertainty
concerning the rate of return on money. The only uncertainty that remains as such is
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the one in post-tax/transfer income. As is evident from (27) and (26), a risk-averse
agent would prefer a high expected value for lnm and as little variability in it as
possible. Since raising the ination rate achieves both, it follows that choosing a
positive ination rate ( > 1) may be desirable.
We now argue that zero ination ( = 1) would be intratemporally e¢ cient but
not so intertemporally. The idea is as follows. Consider a date t that has a relatively
high realization of the endowment wt. As a result, the current money demand, mt; is
high. Since wt 1 was lower, the amount of money balances being brought forward by
the old movers (born at t 1) is relatively small. If the government wishes to preserve
the return on money at 1=; it will have to inject fresh money to supply the higher
money demand at t. Now, movers from period t will arrive in t + 1 with a higher
(relative to the mean) amount of money. If wt+1 is closer to the mean, the amount
allocated to storage in t + 1; i.e., wt+1   mt ; will be lower than the mean amount
stored, and lower with  = 1 as compared to  > 1. Insofar as  > 1 mitigates
the intertemporal transmission of shocks, it may be desirable from the standpoint of
intertemporal e¢ ciency.
To clarify it further, notice that in order to give mt

to date t movers the gov-
ernment will have to tax the date t + 1 young such that their storage allocation,
(1  ) (wt+1 +  t+1) ; leaves mt of goods for date t movers consumption. In other
words, taxes/transfers should be such that (1  ) (wt+1 +  t+1) = wt+1   mt . This
is the rationale behind (25), which is rewritten below as (recall t = )
(wt+1 +  t+1) =   
(1  ) (wt +  t) +
1
1  wt+1: (29)
Equation (29) makes clear that the autocorrelation between total income at two
adjacent periods is negative and the strength of this correlation becomes smaller as
 rises. Thus setting  > 1 may improve intertemporal e¢ ciency; this way shocks to
income get transmitted over time in a more muted fashion.
We now proceed to answer the question: given the real shocks to endowment,
what should a benevolent government do, target the money growth rate (and set the
net money growth rate to zero) or target a positive ination rate? which action would
generate the higher aggregate welfare?
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Proposition 4 Under logarithmic utility, optimal targeting of the money growth rate
is stationary-welfare superior to optimal targeting of the ination rate.
Recall that optimal monetary targeting involves setting  = 1 (xing the money
supply) thereby making the post-tax/transfer income exactly equal to the endow-
ment. In this setting, as discussed earlier, both non-moversand moversconsumption
variability is solely due to the endowment uncertainty. On the other hand, optimal
ination targeting involves xing the ination rate thereby eliminating any uncer-
tainty with respect to the return on money; the residual uncertainty, in this case, is
with regard to the post-tax/transfer income.
Why is monetary targeting superior? A xed money supply rule achieves ex-ante
intratemporal e¢ ciency; it does/can not a¤ect the endowment uncertainty, captured
by 2w. Compare this to a zero net ination rate policy. Of course, as we have seen,
 = 1 can achieve ex-ante intratemporal e¢ ciency; however, it is associated with a
higher volatility of post-tax income, since the variance of post-tax income at  = 1
(denoted 2w+ j=1) is 2w+ j=1 = 
2
w
1 2 > 
2
w. Any  > 1 would distort intratemporal
e¢ ciency but would be associated with reduced post tax income volatility. However,
the volatility of post-tax income still exceeds that under monetary targeting since
2w+ j>1 =
2w
1  2+ 2  1  1
2
 > 2w+ j=1 = 2w1  2 > 2w
holds for all . Overall, relative to monetary targeting, optimal ination targeting
distorts the intratemporal e¢ ciency margin and leaves post-tax/transfer income more
volatile.
4 Liquidity shocks
We now pursue another variation on the standard random relocation model by intro-
ducing liquidity shocks. Specically, we assume that t, the fraction of young agents
relocating to the other location, is drawn each period from an i.i.d. distribution g()
with support [; ] : Denote by e the expected value of  and by 2 its variance.
As described earlier, shocks to  represent money demand or liquidity shocks. We
assume that the value of  is publicly known at the beginning of each period. 9
9Smith (2002) and Antinol, Huybens, and Keister (2001), and Antinol and Keister (2006)
consider settings where such shocks are realized after the bank has made its portfolio decisions. In
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However, to motivate the continued need for banks, we assume that an individuals
relocation status is not known until the end of the period. In other words, while
everyone knows the aggregate fraction of movers at the start of a period, no one
knows who will move until the end of the period.
Our goal as before is to investigate how monetary policy should respond to shocks
to liquidity preference. Analogous to the setting with endowment uncertainty, the
bank cares about next periods liquidity demand because it will potentially inuence
next periods price level and thus the return on money between this period and the
next. As before, we assume the bank knows the distribution for  and forms expecta-
tions on the return on money conditional on g(); in a stationary rational expectations
equilibrium, these expectations are correct for all times. As we demonstrate below,
the impact of such liquidity shocks is entirely di¤erent from the endowment shocks
studied earlier, even though at rst blush it may seem that they ought to have sim-
ilar e¤ects (after all, both shocks work through liquidity demand and the return on
money).
As before, for analytical tractability and intuition building, we start by working
through the case with logarithmic utility. Since our current focus is on shocks to
liquidity, we hold w xed for all t: Just as before, we assume that the bank never
nds it is optimal to use a part of its cash reserves to pay non-movers. Below we will
write down a su¢ cient condition, analogous to that in Condition 1, under which this
assumption will be validated. The banks problem is now described by
max
t
t
Z 

lnRmt g (t+1) dt+1+t ln

t
t

+(1  t) ln

1  t
1  tx

+ln (w +  t) :
(30)
Note that banks choice of  will only consider the second and the third term. It is
easy to verify that the optimal choice of t is given by
t = t for all t: (31)
Now the choice rule for  is state-contingent irrespective of the monetary policy
such situations, banking crisesmay arise, i.e., if the realized value of the liquidity shock is too
high, the bank may run out of all its cash reserves and even be forced to prematurely liquidate
storage.
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regime. This is an important di¤erence with the corresponding problem with endow-
ment shocks.
4.1 Monetary targeting
Under monetary targeting, the government xes the money growth rate at : The
real return to money follows from (19):
Rm;t =
t+1
t
1  t

1  1



h
1  t+1

1  1

i : (32)
Also, since  t =
Mt Mt 1
pt
= mt

1  1


; mt = t (w +  t) ; and t = t; we have
mt = tw=

1  t

1  1


. In contrast to endowment shocks, equilibrium money
demand now is a stochastic fraction of the non-stochastic endowment; as such, the
volatility of money demand is induced entirely by the volatility in the share of the
endowment going towards money and not by the endowment itself. Herein lies the
crucial di¤erence between the way the two types of shocks inuence the economy.
Finally, as  t = mt

1  1


, we have
 t =

1  1


t
1  t

1  1

w; (33)
From (33), it follows that w+ t = w=[1 t

1  1


]; and hence As before,  = 1
would render  t = 0 (set the ination tax rate to zero) thereby removing any income
uncertainty.
We now write down a su¢ cient condition on parameters under which the bank
would not carry cash balances across periods (to pay non-movers).
Condition 2 Under logarithmic utility, the bank never nds it optimal to use a part
of its cash reserves to pay non-movers if
x >
1

E



   (  1)
   (  1)

holds.
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Using (32), and after some algebra, we can write indirect utility as
Wt () = t
Z 

ln
24 t+1
1  t+1

1  1


35 g (t+1) dt+1 + (1  t) ln x (34)
+ lnw   t lnt   (1  t) ln

1  t

1  1


  t ln:
Notice that monetary policy, unlike in the corresponding economy with endowment
shocks, can a¤ect the intertemporal margin here via its e¤ect on the rst term on
the r.h.s of (34). Hence, there would no longer exist a presumption in favor of a zero
money growth rate being optimal. It can be checked that ex ante welfare, dened as
W   E fW ()g = R Wg () d, is given by
W  = (1  e) ln x+ lnw   e ln (35)
 
Z 


(  e) ln+ (1  (  e)) ln

1  

1  1


g () d:
Since W  is assumed to be concave in , the optimal money growth rate ~ solves
d
d
W  = 0. It follows that ~ is implicitly dened by
~ =
1
e
Z 

1  (  e)
1  

1  1
~
g () d: (36)
Proposition 5 In the presence of liquidity shocks, the optimal monetary target in-
volves a negative net money growth rate, i.e., ~ < 1:
In this setup, monetary policy has di¤erent e¤ects on the two groups, movers and
non-movers. The latters consumption is given by x(w+ t) while the formersis given
byRm;t(w+ t):A constant money supply, unlike in the case of real endowment shocks,
is no longer optimal. Why? At  = 1; the consumption of non-movers is simply xw
while that of the movers (using (32)) is t+1
t
w: As before, intragenerational e¢ ciency
requires that E fu0 (cm)g = xE fu0 (cn)g. However, in this setting E fu0 (cm)g =
1
w
E
n
t
t+1
o
> 1
w
, whereas xE fu0 (cm)g = 1w . Thus, in the decentralized equilibrium
E fu0 (cm)g > xE fu0 (cn)g obtains. Thus, even though  = 1 ensures a constant post-
tax/transfer income of w, the uncertain return on money makes the moversexpected
marginal utility of consumption higher than what intergenerational e¢ ciency requires.
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This makes a case for transferring some income to movers by cutting  below 1.
Doing so, however, comes with a cost; since  < 1 implies  < 0; such an action
by transferring income to the old lowers overall income (w + ) of the young; and
reduces storage investment. Since movers have a higher expected marginal utility
of consumption, the social benet obtained by such a transfer may overwhelm the
cost of lowered overall income and reduced consumption of non-movers due to lower
storage investment.
4.2 Ination targeting
Under ination targeting, the government xes the ination rate at : It follows that
the real return to money is given by (24). In this case, using (30), indirect utility
reduces to
Wt =  t ln  + (1  t) ln x+ ln

mt
t

: (37)
With t = t in (25), we now have
mt =   t
(1  t)mt 1 +
t
1  tw (38)
The invariant (long run) distribution for money balances will depend on g () and
. Denote the stationary distribution by 
 (m; g () ; ) with support [m; m]. A
necessary condition for its existence is 
(1 ) < 1. Then, ex ante welfare is given by
W  =  e ln  (1  e) ln x 
Z 

flng g () d+
Z m
m
flnmg
 (m; g () ; ) dm
(39)
and as before the optimal ination rate and the corresponding welfare are dened as
~  argmax fW g and ~W   max

fW g, respectively.
Proposition 6 In the presence of liquidity shocks, the optimal ination target in-
volves a positive net ination rate, i.e., ~ > 1:
The proof of Proposition 6 relies on a second-order Taylor approximation of the
last term on the r.h.s of (39) around me. The intuition for this result closely follows
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the argument laid out in the endowment uncertainty case. As argued before, zero
ination ( = 1) would be intratemporally e¢ cient but not so intertemporally. 10
Notice further that in order to give mt

to date t movers, the government will have to
tax date t+ 1 young such that their storage allocation, (1  t+1) (w +  t+1) ; leaves
mt

of goods for date t movers consumption. In other words, taxes/transfers should
be such that (1  t+1) (w +  t+1) = w   mt . Thus if t+1 is around the mean the
post-tax income in t + 1 will be below the mean. This is the rationale behind (38),
which can be rewritten as
w +  t+1 =   t
(1  t+1) (w +  t) +
1
1  t+1wt+1:
The above makes clear that the autocorrelation between total income at two adjacent
periods is negative and the strength of this correlation becomes smaller as  rises.
Thus setting  > 1 maybe be a good idea from the standpoint of intertemporal
e¢ ciency. Doing so ensures that shocks to income get less transmitted over time.
Finally, we ask: in the presence of liquidity shocks, can we rank the two policy
instruments in terms of welfare?
Claim 1 For any given 
e
; there exists an ^ < 1=2 such that, ~W  ? ~W  for all
e 7 ^, where ~W 

~W 

is the maximized value of stationary welfare under ination
(money growth) targeting.
In other words, if the average number of movers is small enough, ination tar-
geting does a better job. A rough intuition for this is as follows. As we have seen,
optimal monetary targeting involves cutting  below unity since such an action im-
proves intragenerational e¢ ciency. This comes at a cost; after all lowering  diverts
resources from being invested in storage for two reasons: a) cutting  raises taxes and
cuts post-tax income available for investment, and b) reducing  raises the return on
10As before, consider a starting date t at which the current fraction of movers (t) is realized to
be relatively high and so the current money demand is high. Since t 1 was lower, the amount of
money balances being brought over by the old movers (born last period) is relatively small. For the
government to preserve the return on money at 1=; it will have to inject fresh money to supply
this higher money demand. The movers from period t will arrive in t + 1 with a higher (relative
to the mean) amount of money, and the amount of goods left for storage in t + 1, w   mt ; will be
lower than the mean. In sum, the higher the value of , the less is the intertemporal transmission
of shocks.
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money making storage less attractive.11 As a result of this reduced investment in
storage, both movers and non-movers receive a relatively low level of consumption
under monetary targeting. Ination targeting, on the other hand, achieves intragen-
erational e¢ ciency without shifting resources from non-movers to movers. Of course,
because of the aforediscussed intertemporal transmission of shocks, ination targeting
also imposes a cost. It turns out if e is small enough (the persistenceof shocks
is not too high), i.e., its value does not generate near-unit root process for money
balances, ination targeting does a better job.
5 Numerical results: extending to CRRA utility
We have thus far produced a series of analytical results concerning money growth and
ination rate targeting using log utility. We now extend our analysis to incorporate
the more general CRRA utility form: u(c) =

c1    1 =(1   ) where  is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. Our objective here is to verify whether the avor
of the results from Section 3 and 4 continue to obtain for  away from unity. Since it
is not possible to pursue this analytically, we will resort to numerical analysis below.
First we briey sketch the formulation of the bank and the governments problem
for a general specication of shocks. Analogous to (6), we rst rewrite the banks
problem in period t as
max
t2[0;1]
(
(wt +  t)
1 
1  

t 
1 
t Et
n
R1 m;t
o
+ (1  t) [(1  t)x]1 

  1
1  
)
; (40)
whereEt f:g denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information available
at t: Notice Et
n
R1 m;t
o
 R w
w
(Rm;t)
1  f (wt+1) dwt+1 in the case of the endowment
shocks and Et
n
R1 m;t
o
 R 

(Rm;t)
1  g (t+1) dt+1 for the case of liquidity shocks.
The rst order condition to the banks problem leads to
t =
t
t + (1  t)
h
Et
n
I 1t
oi  1

: (41)
11As noted earlier the choice of  is invariant to  under log utility. However, with a CRRA utility
function with an elasticity of substitution greater than one, i.e.,  < 1, reducing  will, in addition,
increase  thus further reducing storage.
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For future reference, e  E () :
Under monetary targeting using (19) It = x=Rm;t is given by
It = x
twt
t+1wt+1
1  t+1

1  1


1  t

1  1


Thus, for given probability distributions for  and w, the equilibrium function  is
obtained as a xed point of (41). Evidently, under monetary targeting, the equilib-
rium t [denoted t ()] is a function of , and the period t realization of  and/or w.
Under ination targeting, however, It = x and the equilibrium t [denoted t ()] is
readily obtained from (41).
Let i 2 f; g denote the index for ination rate and monetary growth targeting
respectively. We can then write the indirect utility at t as
Wt (i) =
1
1  
h
x1  (1  t) (wt +  t (i))1  (1  t (i))    1
i
; i 2 f; g : (42)
As discussed earlier, under monetary targeting,
wt +  t () =
t ()wt
1  t ()

1  1

 ;
whereas under ination targeting, the post-tax income w +  t () is obtained as mtt ,
where m follows a stochastic process given by (see (25))
mt =   t ()
1  t ()
1

mt 1 +
t ()
1  t ()
wt: (43)
The ex-ante stationary welfare under the two policies is expressed as
W i  1
1  
h
x1 E
n
(1  ) (w +  (i))1  (1   (i)) 
o
  1
i
; i 2 f; g ; (44)
where the expectations are obtained under the stationary distribution of all variables.
Next, the optimal policies and optimal welfare levels are dened as
~W i  max
i

W i
	
, ~{  argmaxW i	 ; i 2 f; g
Finally, we represent ~W i in terms of its consumption equivalent ~ci by using
~W i =
h 
~ci
1    1i = (1  ) :
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Our choice of parametric specication is as follows. In the case of endowments
shocks, we x  = 0:2 and assume that w is log-normally distributed. In particular,
we assume lnw  N ( 0:00166; 0:0577). This implies we = 1, 2w = 0:00333, and
w
we
= 0:0577.12 In the case of liquidity shocks, we x w = 1 and assume that  is
i.i.d. and uniformly distributed over [0:18; 0:22].13 This implies that e = 0:2 and

e
= 0:0577. Below, we compare optimal money growth and ination rates under
the two policies, along with their respective welfare levels, for  2 [0:5; 2:1].14
A few words about the computational algorithm is in order. Under monetary
targeting, the main step entails computing the xed point of  as a function of w or
, depending on the nature of the shock. To do so, we guess an initial function15, and
numerically iterate on (41) to convergence. This is done for a xed . Once the 
function is obtained, evaluating (44) is straightforward. By repeating this exercise for
di¤erent values of , we easily obtain ~ and ~W . Under ination targeting, however,
the money supply (and hence the post-tax income) process (43), even under the
assumption of a uniform distribution for w and , does not yield an analytical closed
form stationary distribution. Hence, we resort to simulations. Specically, we rst
x . This yields  explicitly as a function of w or . After assuming an initial value
of m0 = me, we let the computer simulate (43), and for each observation of  or w;
and m compute (42). An average obtained from the previous step yields (44) simply
by the law of large numbers. By repeating this exercise for di¤erent values of , we
obtain ~ and ~W .
5.1 Endowment shocks
We now report on the optimal choices of the ination rate and the money growth
rate as they vary with risk aversion. Our earlier results have established that when
12The same mean and variance can be obtained with w uniformly distributed over support
[0:9; 1:1]. The results under uniform distribution are almost identical to those for the log-normal
distribution.
13The results have been checked with a log-normal distribution of  in which the mean and
variances are kept equal to that under an uniform distribution, and the range of  is restricted to
ensure  < 0:5. Once again, as in the case of endowment shocks, the results are almost identical.
14We nd that  2 [0:5; 2:1] is a fairly representative range, and the qualitative nature of our
results continue to hold when this range is enlarged.
15Our initial guess is  (wt) = , or  (t) = t. The convergence to the equilibrium function at
any desired accuracy is reasonably fast.
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 = 1 (log utility), we have ~ = 1 and ~ > 1: Figure 1(a) shows that ~ > 1 and ~  1
for all . Figure 1(b) presents a sharper inset image to highlight that ~ < 1 for all
 6= 1; for the latter however ~ is relatively closer to one.
Figure 1a: Optimal  and  against  under endowment shocks
Figure 1b: (inset picture) Optimal  against  (endowment shocks)
A rough intuition for why ~ < 1 obtains for all  6= 1 is as follows. To begin with,
30
consider the solution to the banks problem in the deterministic case when  6= 1: As
is clear from (13), the bank would choose
 =

+ (1  ) (x) 1 
:
We know from Proposition 1 that in the deterministic case  = 1 is best, implying
that the banks choice of the reserve-deposit ratio is given by
  
+ (1  ) (x) 1 
:
The question is, why should the government want to deviate from  = 1 in the cor-
responding economy with endowment shocks? The answer to this (discussed below)
relies on two elements that distinguish the deterministic from the stochastic case. In
the stochastic case, a) for  6= 1;  is itself state-contingent causing the comovement
of  and w to be opposite in direction to the co-movement of (1  ) and w, hence-
forth the comovement factor, and b) e R  for  R 1 implying that banks, on an
average, allocate a higher (lower) share of deposits to money in the presence of shocks
relative to their choice in the deterministic case for  R 1; henceforth the money
share factor.16
The fact that  is contingent on w implies that w (consumption of all movers) and
(1  )w (consumption of all non- movers) will move di¤erently.17 Specically, the
comovement of  and w is opposite in direction to the comovement of (1  ) and w:
This is because for  > (<) 1,  and w are positively (negatively) correlated. Why?
When  > 1; and the current realized endowment is high (low), the current price
level is lower (higher) than the average and banks expect a lower (higher) return
on money, leading to a higher (lower) choice of . As a result, the consumption
uncertainty of movers (relative to non-movers) is higher with  > 1. Since the higher
expected marginal utility of the movers implies that transfers of resources to them
have a presumption of being desirable, an optimal monetary policy would call for
transferring income from non-movers to movers by setting  < 1. The reverse holds
16e R  for  R 1 is easily veried from (41). Note rst that It = x wtwt+1 ; thus It is independent
of . By Jensens inequality, E

I 1
	
R (E fIg) 1 for all  R 1. Hence, for  > 1 (< 1) a mean
preserving spread of the endowment process will raise (lower) .
17Recall at  = 1; the currency carried by date t movers purchases cm;t =
t+1wt+1
 units of
consumption per mover, while each non-mover gets cn;t =
(1 t)xwt
1  units to consume.
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true when  < 1. Hence, the co-movement factor argument (part (a)) suggests
that optimal  Q 1 for  R 1.
However, the second factor, the money share factor(part (b)) calls for an oppo-
site prescription. For example, when  > 1, we have e >  implying that relative to
the deterministic case, banks on an average allocate a higher share of their deposits
to money balances potentially hurting non-movers. To compensate, the government
ought to transfer income from movers to non-movers suggesting that optimal  R 1
for  R 1, the exact opposite of the prescription following the comovement factor
argument. Our results indicate that the rst comovement factordominates the sec-
ond money share factorfor all  > 1, while their relative e¤ects reverse for  < 1.
For example, using the parametric specication described above, Figure 2 illustrates
that the average slope (comovement) of  (w) for  = 2 is higher relative to  = 0:5.
On the other hand, e    = 0:0029 for  = 2, while e    =  0:0045 for  = 0:5.
Figure 2:  as function w
To see why ~ > 1; recall from our earlier discussion for log utility that a higher
ination target reduces the intertemporal volatility of income. It seems that as  gets
higher, the relative importance of reducing income volatility rises relative to the need
of ensuring intragenerational e¢ ciency.
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Figure 3 presents the percentage gain in steady state welfare, expressed in terms
of equivalent consumption, that is obtained under monetary targeting relative to
ination targeting.
Figure 3: % change in ~ci from following ~ over ~
Monetary targeting is more desirable relative to ination targeting as  increases.
Our earlier analysis with log utility showed that ination targeting generates a higher
intertemporal income volatility. As  increases, income volatility hurts even more,
thus making monetary targeting even more desirable. The opposite is the case when
 < 1.
5.2 Liquidity shocks
Figure 4 below combines optimal money growth and ination rates in the case of
liquidity shocks for a range of : The main upshot of the gure is that ~  1 and
~ > 1 as  Q 1; optimal monetary targeting always involves implementing a non-
expansionary monetary policy while optimal ination targeting always involves a
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expansionary policy.
Figure 4: Optimal  and  against  (liquidity shocks)
A rough intuition is as follows. At  = 1, the consumption of each mover is given by
t+1
t
w; while that of each non-mover is 1 t
1 txw: It is evident that moversconsumption
is more volatile than that of non-movers.18 Recall from our discussion under log utility
that transferring income to movers by cutting  ensures intragenerational e¢ ciency.
The need for intragenerational insurance becomes stronger as  increases. Hence,
a higher reduction in  is required for larger values of . The intuition behind an
increasing relationship between ~ and  is similar to that under endowment shocks.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the percentage loss in steady state welfare, expressed
in terms of equivalent consumption, under monetary targeting relative to ination
18When  = 1 (log utility), the consumption of each mover is given by t+1t w; while that of each
non-mover is xw which is non-stochastic. For general ; the consumption of nonmovers will be
stochastic but not as volatile as that of the movers.
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targeting.
Figure 5: % change in ~ci from following ~ over ~
A rough intuition for this follows the discussion after Proposition 1. Here, under
monetary targeting a higher  will imply that ~ will have to be lowered a lot(as
evident from Figure 4), which, as discussed earlier can be costly in terms of lost
income from storage. Thus, the desirability of ination targeting increases with .
6 Extensions
6.1 State-contingent rules
Thus far, we have worked under the assumption that the benevolent central bank
chooses, at the start of time, either a money growth rate or a ination rate and
intervenes no further. How would our analysis get amended if the central bank
could control its desired monetary policy instrument every period after observing
the realization of the shock? Clearly, in that case, the policy rules will in general
depend on the history of shocks. In our environment, however, the rules will be
solely contingent on the current period shock as the shocks being considered are i.i.d.
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Below, we solve for such rules. As shown by Bhattacharya and Singh (2007),
solving a constrained planning problem turns out to be analytically much simpler
in such environments.19 Therefore, we will rst compute the allocations under a
constrained planning problem and then work out the implied state-contingent rules.
Before we formulate a constrained planning problem, we will rst need to review
the equilibrium constraints of the decentralized economy. Recall that in the decen-
tralized equilibrium, irrespective of the monetary policy chosen, movers born in the
previous period purchase goods out of the current period endowment. The remain-
ing gets stored, all of which is consumed by the non-movers. In other words, goods
consumed by ultimate movers cannot be stored; conversely, movers cannot consume
stored goods. In a constrained planning problem, the planner must be accordingly
constrained to allocate consumption (denoted cm;t 1) to the previous periods movers
from the current endowment (wt) and store the rest (st) to be given as consumption
(denoted cn;t) next period to the current periods non-movers (of measure t).
The planners date t constraint can then be written as
t 1 cm;t 1 = wt   st;
cn;t =
stx
1  t :
Under the planners allocation, the indirect utility of a representative household is
given by:
upt  t 1 u

wt   st
t 1

+ (1  t) u

st x
1  t

: (45)
The planners problem then reduces to20
max
fstg
Et
1X
k=0
upt+k:
19Bhattacharya and Singh (2007) describe the construct of a constrained planning problem as
follows: Consider a decentralized economy with a specied set of markets, rules of trade, an equi-
librium concept, and a policy regime (a restricted set of policies). Such a specication of markets
and rules of the game generates a set of equilibrium allocations that are attainable by a policymaker
in the decentralized economy from within that policy regime. One can then set up a much simpler
pseudo-planning problem in which the planner is restricted to choose from a set that contains (and
may potentially be larger than) the aforementioned set of equilibrium allocations in the decentralized
economy. Call the solution to this constrained planning problem the constrained planning solution.
Among policies in the policy regime, if there is one that allows the decentralized economy to achieve
the same allocation as under the constrained planning solution, it is the optimal policy.
20Under our formulation, each generation is equally weighted. With no time discounting, techni-
cally, the summation is not dened. However, as it turns out below, the planners problem is static
and therefore this issue can be safely ignored.
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Since st matters only for u
p
t , it is easy to see that the planners problem is essentially
a one period problem. The optimal choice of st is then simply characterized by
u0

wt   st
t 1

= x u0

st x
1  t

;
which for log utility reduces to
t 1
wt   st =
1  t
st
: (46)
Recall that in the decentralized equilibrium t (wt +  t) is reserved by banks as
cash while (1  t) (wt +  t) is stored; also t = t for all t. Then to implement (46)
using a state-contingent money growth rule,  t must satisfy
t 1
wt   (1  t) (wt +  t) =
1
wt +  t
which using wt+ t = wt=

1  t

1  1
t

yields the following state-contingent rule
t =
t
t 1
: (47)
Two features of this rule are worth discussing. First, when the measure of current
period movers is relatively large, i.e., (t > t 1) ; a monetary injection is desirable.
Intuitively, the best that such a rule can do is equalize the marginal utilities of movers
of the past generation with that of the non-movers from the current generation.
Under log utility, this amounts to allocating wt equally across a population of 1  
t+t 1. Thus, the rule allocates an amount wt= (1  t + t 1) to each individual;
given directly to the movers for consumption and stored for the non-movers. In the
decentralized equilibrium, per non-mover storage is wt +  t = wt
1 t

1  1
t
 . Setting
t =
t
t 1
thus obtains the best, i.e., it decentralizes what a constrained planner can.
Second, the rule is independent of shocks to the endowment process. Indeed, in
the absence of liquidity shocks, the best policy would be to set t = 1 for all t. In other
words, when there are no shocks to liquidity, it is best to x the money supply.21 This
21Observe that (47) can be equivalently implemented through a state-contingent ination-rate
rule in the following way. If the only shocks are those to the endowment process, (47) implies  = 1;
then
t =
mt 1
mt
=
wt 1
wt
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statement has an important implication: in the sole presence of endowment shocks,
the state contingent money supply rule coincides with the state uncontingent money
supply rule (monetary targeting).
How do monetary targeting and ination targeting fare against the corresponding
state-contingent rules in the case of liquidity shocks? Substituting equation (46) in
(45), one obtains
cm;t =
w
1  t+1 + t ; cn;t =
w
1  t + t 1x:
Denote ~W sct as the welfare of generation t under the state contingent rule. Then,
ex-ante welfare is given by
E
n
~W sct
o
 E
(
t lnw + (1  t) lnw + (1  t) ln x
 t ln (1  t+1 + t)  (1  t) ln (1  t + t 1)
)
:
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 7 In the sole presence of endowment shocks, the state contingent rule
coincides with the state uncontingent monetary targeting rule. In the sole presence of
liquidity shocks, the state contingent rule strictly welfare dominates the state uncon-
tingent ination targeting rule.
6.2 Alternative mechanisms for monetary injections
The results up to this point rely on lump-sump taxes/transfers as the mechanism for
conducting monetary policy. Below, we discuss two alternative mechanisms.
One alternative would be to inject money through open market operations.In our
environment, government bonds will serve simply as an extra store of value and are
directly held by the banks on behalf of their depositors. Schreft and Smith (2004)
study the welfare role of government bonds in an economy similar to ours except
that the rate of return on storage in their setup is stochastic. Since the return on
should be implemented. Similarly, under liquidity shocks,
t =
mt 1
mt
t =
mt 1
t 1
t
mt
=
w +  t 1
w +  t
=
t 1 + 1  t
t 2 + 1  t 1 :
should be followed.
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these bonds are received only after the movers have left, in equilibrium non-movers
consume stored goods as well as goods purchased from the cash returns on bonds. In
sum, if bonds exist, non-movers consume stored goods as well as a part of the current
endowment. Bhattacharya and Singh (2007) show that introducing government bonds
does not improve welfare relative to the case where controlling money supply is the
only policy option and money is injected in a lump-sum manner. This result can be
easily extended to the environment of this paper.
An interesting alternative however is to consider money injections (withdrawals)
through ad valorem transfers (taxes). Since money is held only by the old movers they
are the sole recipients (payers) of such transfers (taxes). Formally, let the transfers
be implemented in the following manner:
Mt+1 = t Mt;
where (t   1) denotes the ad valorem transfer rate. It then directly follows that
mt+1 = Rm;t t mt (48)
Since the transfers only go to the old movers, the deposits by the young at the
bank always equal the endowment. Therefore, period t cash reserves of banks is
mt  twt. Note further that the movers of generation t will have mt+1 real balances
net of transfers available for consumption in t + 1. Thus, cm;t =
mt+1
t
= Rm;t t mt
t
=
twtRm;tt+1
t
. Accordingly, we rewrite the problem faced by the banks as
max
t2[0;1]

tEt

u

twtRm;tt+1
t

+ (1  t)u

1  t
1  twtx

: (49)
With CRRA preferences, the rst order condition for t is
t =
t
t + (1  t)x
1 


Et

t+1wt+1
twt
1   1 ; (50)
which utilizes (48) and the identity mt  twt. Clearly, t is independent of the
transfer (t) policy. Further, as cm;t =
mt+1
t
=
t+1wt+1
t
, the welfare is also independent
of transfer policy. Thus, ad valorem rates are entirely irrelevant for welfare.
Intuitively, the consumption of movers is determined by the next periods banks
choice of fractional reserves, which in turn depends on the next-to-the-next periods
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choice and so on. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the bank chooses  to
equate the marginal consumption of its non-movers (which is independent of nominal
variables in any case) to that of its movers; but the latter is essentially determined
by next periods banks. The rate of return on money is irrelevant.
Denote ~W prop as ex-ante welfare under ad valorem transfers. Then, for u = ln;
using (50) in (49) yields
~W prop =

E flnwg+ (1  ) ln x, for t = 8t
eE flng   E f lng+ lnw + (1  e) ln x; for wt = w8t
Under both types of shocks, the welfare equals that under a xed money supply (see
(22) and (35)). The transfers are irrelevant.
Thus, ad valorem transfers, state-contingent rule, and xed money supply are
all ex-ante equivalent under endowment shocks. However, as we already know, the
welfare under optimal ination targeting exceeds the welfare obtained under opti-
mal monetary targeting (~ < 1) which in turn dominates a xed money supply rule
(~ = 1). Hence, ex-ante, ad valorem transfers are dominated by ination targeting
with lump-sum transfers.
7 Conclusion
This paper revisits the classic issue of the optimal choice of monetary instruments
faced by central bankers around the world. To that end, we produce a two-period lived
pure-exchange overlapping generations model in the tradition of Townsend (1987) and
Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1997) where limited communication and stochastic
relocation create an endogenous transactions role for at money. We study two kinds
of shocks, real shocks (to the endowment) and liquidity shocks (to the fraction of
agents relocating). First, our results indicate that when the shocks are real, welfare
is higher under money growth targeting; when the shocks are nominal and not large,
welfare is higher under ination targeting. Secondly, while under ination targeting
it is always optimal to pursue an expansionary policy, it is never optimal to do so
under money growth targeting.
We also examined alternative mechanisms for conduct of monetary policy. We nd
that there is no role for targeting rules when monetary injections are implemented
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through proportional money transfers. The equilibrium under proportional transfers
can be obtained by a xed money supply; the transfers are irrelevant. Similarly,
conduct of open market operations would also have no welfare e¤ects.
The models used in this paper do not include productive capital. It is safe to
conjecture that adding capital would have strong implications for many of the results
primarily because a propagation mechanism for shocks would then appear. Similarly,
one could explore the likely impact on our results of assuming serially correlated
shocks. There again, one can hazard a safe guess that for low levels of shock per-
sistence, the results in the current paper would most likely continue to hold. In any
case, these appear to be interesting avenues for future work.
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Appendix
A Proof of Condition 1
Suppose after reserving a fraction  of deposits for movers, banks may further split
the rest (1  ) into money (a fraction 1  ) and storage () for non-movers. Then,
the problem for the bank is
max
ft2[0;1];t2[0;1]g
Et

u
t

Rm;t (wt +  t)

+ (1  )u

(1  t) (tx+ (1  t)Rm;t)
(1  ) (wt +  t)

:
Dene cn;t  (1 t)(tx+(1 t)Rm;t)(1 ) (wt +  t). The rst order condition with respect to
t can be compactly written as
Et [u
0 (cn;t)x  u0 (cn;t)Rm;t]
(
 0; =  if t < 1
 0; =  if t > 0
:
Note that when  = 1, cn;t is non-stochastic, and the above condition reduces to
x > Et fRm;tg
With logarithmic utility, we know from (19) that pt
pt+1
= wt+1
wt
. Then x > Et fRm;tg
will hold for all possible realizations of wt if and only if the condition in the statement
of Condition 1 holds.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Using (27),
W  =   ln    ln+ (1  ) ln x+ E (lnm ()) ; (51)
where the distribution of m is governed by (25). We rst take a second-order Taylor
approximation of the last term around me:
E flnmg ' lnme   1
2
2m
(me)2
: (52)
Using (26) with (52) in (51), and di¤erentiating with respect to  yields
dW 
d
=  

+

2
1  + 

+
1
2
2w
(we)2
 (1  )
[(1  )   ]2
Thus,
dW 
d

=1
=
1
2
2w
(we)2
 (1  )
(1  2)2 > 0
Assuming W  is concave in , the above implies ~ > 1.
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C Proof of Condition 2
The proof follows that of Condition 1 closely. To begin with, note that t is known
at the start of t: Then, as in the proof of Condition 1, the required condition reduces
to x > Et fRm;tg : Using (32), it follows that
x > Et fRm;tg ,
x > Et
8<:t+1 1  

1  1



h
1  t+1

1  1

i
9=; ,
x >
1

E



   (  1)
   (  1)

:

D Proof of Proposition 4
We start by computing the maximized value of stationary welfare under monetary
targeting, denoted by ~W . From (22), it can be checked that at  = 1;
~W  = (1  ) ln x+
Z w
w
flnwg f (w) dw:
Analogous to (52), we can write
R w
w
flnwg f (w) dw  E flnwg ' lnwe   1
2
2w
(we)2
and
so
~W  = (1  ) ln x+ lnwe   1
2
2w
(we)2
Denote by W ; the maximized value of stationary welfare under ination targeting.
From (28), it follows that
~W  =   ln ~   ln+ (1  ) ln x+ E (lnm (~)) ;
where it is known from Proposition 3 that ~ > 1: Using (52) and (26), note that
E flnm (~)g = lnme   1
2
2m
(me)2
= ln
we
1  + 
~
  1
2
2w
(we)2
(1  ) ~ + 
(1  ) ~   :
Then
~W  =   ln ~ ln+(1  ) ln x+lnwe ln

1  

+
1
~

  1
2
2w
(we)2
(1  ) ~ + 
(1  ) ~   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Then it is easily checked that
~W    ~W  =  ln ~ + ln

1  + 
~

+
2w
2 (we)2

(1  ) ~    (53)
The third term on the r.h.s of (53) is positive by virtue of assumption (??). How
about the rst two terms? The rst one is positive as and the second one is negative
as it is known that ~ > 1. Notice that the rst term increases with ~ while the
second one decreases. What is the minimum of the sum of the rst two terms in
terms of ~? If we can show that the sum reaches a minimum at ~ = 1 and is non-
positive, then we would know that the sum is positive for ~ > 1: Di¤erentiating
 ln ~ + ln
 
1  + 
~

with respect to ~ yields a turning point of ~ = 1 and ~ =1:
Checking the second derivative reveals that the sign is positive at ~ = 1 implying
that  ln ~+ ln
 
1  + 
~

is a global minimum at ~ = 1 and so the minimum value
of  ln ~ + ln
 
1  + 
~

= 0; clearly since ~ > 1;  ln ~ + ln
 
1  + 
~

> 0 holds.

E Proof of Proposition 5
Di¤erentiating the ex-ante welfare expression in (35) with respect to  yields
d
d
W  =  
e

+
1
2
Z 

1  (  e)
1  

1  1
~
g () d:
Evaluating the above expression at  = 1 obtains
d
d
W 

=1
= e

 1 + 1
e
Z 

[   (  e)] g () d

= : 
Z 

 (  e) g () d =  
Z 

2g () d  e
Z 

g () d

=   E  2  (E())2   2 < 0
Since W  is assumed to be concave in ; the above implies that ~ < 1:
F Proof of Proposition 6
Dene t
1 t  t. Then e  E fg and 2  E

(  e)2	. Then
mt =   t
(1  t)mt 1 +
t
1  twt , mt = t

w   1

mt 1

(54)
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Taking expectations on both sides, we get
me = e

w   1

me

, or me =
e
1 + 
e

w
Squaring both sides of (54) and taking expectations yields
2m + (m
e)2 = E
 
2
 " 1
2
2m +

w   1

me
2#
which using the preceding equation can be rewritten as
2m
(me)2
=
2
1  E(2)
2
:
Using (26) with (52) in (51), di¤erentiating (51) with respect to  yields
dW 
d
=  
e

+
e
2
1 + 
e

+
1
2
2
E(2)
3
1  E(2)
2
2 :
It follows that
dW 
d

=1
=  e + 
e
1 + e
+
1
2
2E (
2)
(1  E (2))2
Note that E = E


1 
	
= E

1
1    1
	
> 1
Ef1 g   1 = 
e
1 e . Hence,
1
e
  1 > 1
e
or 
e
1+e
> e. Thus,
dW 
d

=1
>
1
2
2E (
2)
(1  E (2))2 > 0
Assuming W  is concave in , the above implies that ~ > 1.
G Proofof Claim 1
We know that under certainty ~W  = ~W . Below, we show that introducing an
innitesimal amount of uncertainty makes one regime dominate the other depending
on the value of  in the deterministic case. The result has been veried numerically
for all levels of uncertainty. Recall
W  =  e ln  + (1  e) ln x+ E fln (w +  ())g
W  = (1  e) ln x+ lnw   e ln  E f(  e) lng   E

(1  (  e)) ln

1  

1  1


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Then
W   W  =  e ln 

+ E fln (w +  ())g   lnw + E f(  e) lng
+E

(1  (  e)) ln

1  

1  1


(55)
Note that for small amount of uncertainty, using Taylor expansion, we can get
E f(  e) lng ' E
 
(  e)2
e
!
=
2
e
(56)
where the inequality follows from the assumption of a symmetric distribution for .
Similarly,
E fln (w +  ())g ' ln (E fw +  ()g)  1
2
2w+
(E fw + g)2 (57)
For future use, lets rst compute the mean and the variance of w +  () = m()

under ination targeting. Recall that ms distribution is governed by:
mt =  t

mt 1 + tw (58)
where   
1  . It has been shown that
me =
e
1 + 
e

w
2m =
2
1  E(2)
2

1
1 + 
e

2
w2
Note that (58) can be written as
mt
t
= w +  t = w +mt   mt 1

Then,
E fw + g = E
nm

o
= w +

1  1


me
=
1 + e
1 + 
e

w (59)
Further, after some algebra, it can be shown that
Var fw +  ()g =

1 +
1 + 2e
2

2
1  E(2)
2

1
1 + 
e

2
w2 (60)
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We want to show that introducing an innitesimal amount of uncertainty makes
one regime superior to another. Notice that when both w and  are deterministic,
~ = ~ = 1. Our idea is to use Envelope theorem to see if introducing an innitesi-
mal uncertainty (around certainty) makes W   W  6= 0. Can we sign the welfare
di¤erence at the margin then? To x ideas, consider the following experiment. Sup-
pose  is stochastic, uniform and i.i.d. over support [e   ; e + ], and assume that
e+
1 (e+) < 1. If  = 0, then obviously
~W    ~W  = 0
We want to evaluate
d
d

~W    ~W 

=0
(61)
Invoking Envelope theorem implies that we only need to evaluate
d
d
 
W =1  W =1
=0
to sign (61).
Thus, substituting  =  = 1 in (55) yields
W =1  W =1 = E fln (w +  ())g   lnw + E f(  e) lng (62)
For any distribution, x 
e
= ; where  can be made arbitrarily small. Then, we
can use Taylor series approximation (56) and (57) in (62) as higher order terms can
be readily neglected. Substituting  = 1 in (59) and (60), and using (56) and (57) in
(62), we get
W =1  W =1
e
=
=
2
e
  
2

1  E (2)
1
1 + e
= e2  
2
(e)2
1  e   2
(e)2
where   1
1  . It is easy to verify that
2
2
<< 2 for small values of e. On
the other hand, as e increases e increases and the denominator in the second
term gets smaller. Thus, by continuity, there exists an ^ for each  such that
W =1  W =1j
e
= ? 0 for all e 7 ^.
H Proof of Proposition 7
Since t   t 1 or t+1   t is small, we have
t ln (1  t+1 + t) ' t (t   t+1) ;
t ln (1  t + t 1) ' t (t 1   t) :
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Then, to a second order approximation:
E ( t ln (1  t+1 + t) + t ln (1  t + t 1)) ' 0:
Also to a second order approximation
ln (1  t + t 1) ' 2:
This gets
E
n
~W sct
o
' lnw + (1  e) ln x+ 2
> lnw + (1  e) ln x+ 2
Recall that the welfare under optimal ination targeting  e ln  + (1  e) ln x +
E fln (w +  ())g < lnw + (1  e) ln x. This is because with no liquidity shocks,
~ = 1 and the welfare equals the r.h.s. of the inequality; under shocks the welfare is
lower. Thus, as one would expect, state-contingent rules strictly dominate ination
targeting under liquidity shocks.
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